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1. Preface
This paper is part of a project entitled Analyzing the Science-Policy-Practice Interface in 
Climate Change Adaptation in East and West Africa being carried out by the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) as a part of the CGIAR Research Program on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS).  CCAFS and ILRI are investigating what kinds 
of social, institutional and policy environments best facilitate the development of promising 
adaptation options, and lead to the establishment of effective agricultural adaptation plans 
and strategies at the national, regional and global level.  One way in which the program is 
doing this is through use of different innovative modes of interaction between scientists and 
policymakers to influence the design and implementation of national policies regarding 
climate change adaptation.  Understanding how and why different approaches to science-
policy interaction succeed or fail is crucial. 
The aim of the Science-Policy-Practice Interface project is to deepen understanding of policy 
and governance processes around climate change in order to contribute to more effective 
engagement between national governments and donors, and consequently towards climate 
smart food systems. What factors have influenced the development of existing policies?  
And how do policies interact with each other as they are being implemented?  Pastoralist 
and agropastoralist livelihoods and adaptation choices are influenced by an array of policies 
and also by the interplay among policies.  The role of science in feeding knowledge about 
livelihoods and households’ adaptation strategies into policy processes, and the dynamics of 
how scientific information is produced, delivered, received and drawn upon in the shaping of 
policies is poorly understood. 
This working paper is a contribution toward this effort, describing aspects of the policy 
environment in Ethiopia, written by ILRI graduate fellow Wondwossen Wondemagegnehu. 
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4. Introduction 
This paper describes how the 2011 Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy came to be 
realized, in a policy environment that is characterized by competing narratives, 
organizational and institutional arrangements, and power relations. The policy process was 
complex, entailing interactions among and between people and institutions at multiple 
layers. The dynamism and level of interaction among national and supranational actors, as 
well as linkages with local actors upon whom policies gain expression are part of this 
intricate process. Indeed, as scholars in the field note, policies are outcomes of social 
interactions (Robinson and Crane 2015) and seldom the results of predictable processes that 
operate neatly along “assembly lines” (Deborah Stone 2002: 169). Though this paper 
analyzes a particular case, it highlights the complexity of policy processes, and by so doing, 
challenges the linear thinking that assumes policies as inevitable products. A shift away from 
heuristic approaches explaining policy change would require analyses grounded on empirical 
evidence, which this paper attempts to do in the context of Ethiopian policy making.  
 
In this paper I apply a framework to describe “an emergent policy environment” (Robinson 
and Crane 2015:1) characterized by analytical categories comprising discourses, structures 
and practices that operate to influence positive or negative feedbacks informing policy 
outcomes. Through a set of open-ended questions, this paper seeks to throw light on what 
narratives, structures and practices were at play to inform the current climate policy 
direction in Ethiopia. It questions how these analytical lenses operated; interacted with each 
other or converged to induce responses in the national policy space; and the pathways that 
enabled such interaction. The framework containing these analytical lenses is briefly 
described in the next section together with the core literature expounding on it. 
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5. Conceptual Framework 
The approach provided by Robinson and Crane (2015) to describe what the authors call an 
emergent policy environment comprises discourses, structures and practices. These lenses 
and the interaction between them and with other elements help to outline an analytical 
approach toward understanding how the Ethiopian climate policy path was influenced. The 
core elements of these analytical components are briefly outlined as relevant to the case 
study.  
i. Discourses or narratives are “institutionalized linguistic and narrative frames that 
shape actors’ interpretations of information, as well as inform their action choices.” 
(Robinson and Crane 2015: 4). As tools of analyzing interactions, discourses are understood 
as constructs that are created, modified, sustained and reified to frame understandings by 
offering “rich empirical descriptions and story lines” (Twyman et al. 2011:3). Discourses can 
serve as “instruments of power” when used to pursue political objectives (Robinson and 
Crane 2015:4). Edelman (1988) asserts that solutions precede problems both 
“chronologically and psychologically” when elucidating on how narratives could be used to 
justify solutions to typical social problems (22). In such circumstances, discourses are 
manipulated to induce a favored pathway which “people might otherwise find painful, 
unwise, or irrelevant” (Edelman 1988:22). “Any analysis of policy formation that accepts the 
wider societal issue as raison d’etre for the action [as rational choice theories typically do] 
romanticizes the grounds for governmental action and hence incorrectly predicts which 
policies will find organized and intense advocates” (23). 
 
ii. Structures, as an analytical tool, is an embodiment both of organizations and 
institutions, where these are in turn understood to mean “collective actors in society” and 
“rules and norms which provide the framework for action” respectively (Robinson and Crane 
2015: 5).  
 
iii. Practices denote the exercise of human agency. As an analytical tool it serves to 
identify how and through what means actors “pursue [their] objectives and shape 
outcomes.” It helps to analyze “how people draw upon, interpret, circumvent, or resist 
institutional frameworks in order to pursue specific objectives that shape the policy 
environment and related outcomes and how people draw upon prevailing discourse or 
develop counter- narratives in order to pursue specific objectives that shape the policy 
environment and related outcomes.”  (Robinson and Crane 2015:7). 
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6. Methodology 
This paper draws upon, a series of interviews conducted with 23 people from an array of 
organizations. The purpose of the interviews was to identify how and in what way 
discourses, structures and practices or a combination thereof figured at the policy 
formulation stage and how each of these elements interacted to influence national climate 
policy making. The questions were designed in an open-ended format to allow room for 
interviewees to expand on the questions they are most familiar with given their 
understanding of the national policy process as pertinent to the CRGE formulation stage. A 
checklist (see Appendix) was prepared in advance to trigger discussions that could generate 
data on respondents’ views, among others, on the national climate policy process, their 
respective roles (if any) during the formulation phase, understanding of the problem, the 
chosen path towards a policy response, alternative views, if and how the options considered 
were incremental or transformative, public engagement mechanisms, organizational and 
institutional arrangements, power plays, etc.  Sufficient time was allowed for each interview 
session to cater for rich discussions around these broad themes.  
Interview participants included experts from government agencies involved at some level 
with the CRGE process. Accordingly, this involved experts from the Ethiopian Development 
Research Institute, the Prime Minister’s Office, the former Environmental Protection 
Authority, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development, Ministry of Transport, National Meteorological Agency, Ministry of 
Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture 
as well as the various agricultural research institutions. The experts contacted were key in 
the sense that most of them worked as members or coordinators of Sub-Technical 
Committees and Technical Committees of the CRGE. They were instrumental in data 
collection and analysis that shaped the baseline situation, projected scenarios as well as the 
levers eventually selected to bring the offset measures necessary to achieve carbon 
neutrality. Some members of the donor community, private sector, academia and members 
of non-governmental organizations that were active during the CRGE formulation stage or 
after its adoption were also interviewed to share their understanding of the process.  
Documents were also reviewed. This included official government documents, peer 
reviewed articles as well as grey materials. Government documents reviewed include the 
Green Economy section of the CRGE, the CRGE vision document, the National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (2007), the EPACC (2010), the draft National Adaptation Plans (2016),  
the 1997 Environmental Policy of Ethiopia as well as various regulatory instruments 
including the Ethiopian Charities law (2009) and the Environmental Organs Establishment 
Proclamation (2002). The end purpose of looking into these documents was not to do 
content analyses. Rather, the reviews were done to provide more evidence triangulate data 
generated out of the using the analytical framework introduced in the previous section.  
Data gathered was analyzed through the lenses of discourses, structures and practices to see 
how these figured, conflicted or reinforced each other to induce a policy outcome. Interview 
transcripts were examined through these analytical frames to determine how well the 
framework was able to portray the storylines around national climate policy making, and 
conversely, how the framework itself could lend itself to the use of empirical data to justify 
or refute it. To place the discussions in context the paper, in the next section, outlines the 
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national development trajectory that preceded the CRGE formulation. Again, the purpose 
here is to sketch historical and factual accounts to provide sufficient detail that serves as a 
reference to put the discussions and analysis into perspective.  
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7. Context: A national development trajectory  
In 2010, the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, announced a new development 
plan (the GTP) and its ambitious goal of raising the country to a middle-income economic 
status by the year 2025 through a development pathway that is both “climate resilient” and 
“carbon neutral” (EPA 2011). In less than a year’s time, the mitigation component of this 
vision was translated into an Inter-ministerial decision known as the Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Strategy or “CRGE” for short. Through the CRGE, distinct economic development 
options were laid out across six economic sectors1 to be pursued between years 2011 and 
2030 (FDRE 2011). These investment routes are promised to be “clean” and are meant to be 
implemented to achieve the dual goals of a middle-income economy, on the one hand, and a 
net zero increase in carbon emissions on the other. This strategy was formally adopted by an 
Inter-Ministerial Committee in November 2011 and was subsequently launched at the 
international Climate Summit that took place during the same month, in Durban, South 
Africa.  
Both these promises (of a robust growth through a green growth path) were seen by many 
to be clearly ambitious with some still doubting if the green pathway would be any greener 
or if it would be any different from the conventional development path (Held et al. 2013). 
That aside, such an economic growth simply meant leapfrogging from a Least Developed 
Country status2 of an annual per capita income of 380 US Dollars to a middle-income status 
of at least 1,000 US Dollars in per capita income. And this is to be delivered in just about ten 
years. To add a layer to the challenge, the government has through the CRGE, pledged to 
make the growth in a pathway that releases no additional carbon into the atmosphere with 
strong economic and social structures built to be resilient to the ensuing climate change.  
The adoption of the CRGE strategy has marked quite a leap compared to other policy 
development processes in Ethiopia. Held et al. (2013) describes any predecessor policy 
adoption as slow and unnoticeable compared to the current. Since the establishment of a 
stand-alone environmental agency in 1993 in the country, a number of policies were 
adopted across a range of issue areas. But they were largely confined within the 
environment sector and without triggering much of a system shock. For one thing, meshing-
in environmental concerns into economic policies has been unthinkable for the past several 
years. The GTP-CRGE complex has shown a complete unison between environmental and 
economic prerogatives where the CRGE appeared as a package of investment pathways that 
are primarily meant to usher in economic gains than ensuring environmental safety. 
Compared to previous economic plans, the GTP has itself characterized a new era where 
significant development ambition was reflected (IFPRI 2012:1). The analytical lenses used in 
this paper sheds light on some of the key questions around the issue of policy change that 
brought about this national measure. The subsequent sections outline the narratives, 
structures, practices, individual/ organizational agency and the interplay amongst them as 
this shaped up an emergent policy environment in the context of climate policy.  
                                                          
 
1
 These six sectors are agriculture, industry, energy, cities and buildings, transport, and forests. 
2
 Ethiopia is currently one of the 48 named Least Developed Countries with in the United Nations 
classification.  
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8. Findings: The climate problem and the green
economy solution
For the past several years, the idea of rapid economic recovery has persuasively been placed 
as the prime solution to pull the nation out of the lingering poverty with which the nation 
has been characterized. The ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic 
Front, and its top leadership considered that it was incumbent upon the government and 
the party to overcome this stereotype once and for all (Alex 2013). The type of development 
that was introduced as the solution (through the GTP and later on the CRGE) was “green 
economy” or, interchangeably, “green growth”. Nationally, no authoritative definition was 
given to what the concept of green economy entails. However, the international literature 
on the concept offers some ideas.  
Green growth is broadly understood to represent utilization of resources in an “efficient, 
cleaner and more resilient” manner (Hallegatte et. al 2012:3); enhance “natural capital as a 
critical economic asset and as a source of public benefit….” (UNEP 2011: 216). Like the 
notion of sustainable development, the introduction of the green economy concept is an 
attempt to represent unseen contributions of nature in economic activities through 
interventionist approaches and sustainable markets (Borel-Salladin et al.  2013: 217).  These 
same components of a green economy characterize the very precepts enshrined within the 
CRGE document. Its introductory statements affirm that traditional forms of growth would, 
among others, result in “…unsustainable use of natural resources” calling for a need to 
reverse the trajectory (FDRE 2011:1). This shift in national political mood is an offshoot of a 
number of circumstances that may include felt handicaps of GDP as a measure of growth; or 
a move towards “green washing” the orthodoxy of classical economic growth; or a 
deliberate move to attract foreign financing opportunities resulting, for instance from global 
negotiations.  
A series of circumstances that materialized in domestic and international politics seemed to 
have culminated to shape up such policy perspectives. Outstanding in domestic politics were 
two factors: the initiation of a transformational development objective in 2009-2010; and a 
re-orientation of key organizations in national government. Internationally, there were 
opportunities that unraveled emerging global trends to politicians and experts that in turn 
helped to influence national policy. The following is a discussion on these factors and their 
implications in shaping up the policy environment on climate change. 
The “Economic Transformation” Agenda 
The government was trapped in an urgency to embrace what one respondent from the 
former EPA (now the MEFCC) described as “the transformation agenda” during the time 
preceding the launch of the first phase of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). In 
2009, the respondent states, all government agencies were requested by the late Prime 
Minister (Meles Zenawi) to come up with their respective plan that would transform the 
national economy. “It was in fact an instruction to move away from the business as usual, 
annual, routine planning … which we were used to.” Economic planning in Ethiopia is largely 
incremental done every five years where portions of the aggregate were annually cascaded 
for sector actions. Accordingly, delivery of results is expected at the end of each fiscal year. 
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Sectors were evaluated for results attained against the goals they annually set. Such has 
been the trend pursued during the pre-GTP economic plans, such as the Sustainable 
Development and Poverty Reduction Paper (SDPRP) covering the years 2001-2005, and the 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) spanning the 
years between 2005 and 2010. However, the request from the Prime Minister in 2009 had a 
different tone. He was requesting a deliberate shift away from the routinized aggregation of 
sector-specific periodic plans and embark upon “transforming the entire economy.” The 
procedure was to remain the same but the thinking has to be different. Accordingly, sector-
specific, transformative plans were eventually developed, evaluated, debated upon and 
compiled into a single package to become - as it did - the Growth and Transformation Plan 
(GTP-I).  
The “Environment” sector had a rather low profile with no or weak links with the rest of the 
economic sectors. The GTP initiative offered an opportunity, according to the former head of 
EPA, to re-configure how “environment” and “environmental protection” was later to be 
perceived and reckoned. For a larger part of its history, environmental protection was highly 
misunderstood to the extent of being considered “a hindrance to development,” he 
observes. Its organizational status did not allow it to participate in the deliberations of the 
Council of Ministers – apparently a venue where major decisions were made that have 
environmental implications. The transformation agenda presented thus a unique instance 
for EPA and the entire environment sector. The same respondent has the following remark. 
“When the GTP initiative was launched and we were waited upon for setting a goal for the 
environment, we were unable to come up with a catchy vision …that explains what 
transformative meant within our sector.” It was not easy to propose for a paradigm shift 
when it comes to the concept of conservation itself. Environmental stewardship has always 
been associated with protection (guarding away resources from use) for most part of 
Ethiopian environmental history. “That is what people understood reading the environment 
policy,” he states. Protection has itself been understood to mean saving a particular 
resource or keeping it from use and abuse. Bringing in new approaches was difficult because 
those in government circles were so used to a paradigm of protection anchored in the 
protectionist view of resource management.  
Such a shift in thinking requires a daunting undertaking of revising indicators. Referring to 
the old understanding of protection, the former EPA head remarked, “…the old indicators 
were wrong. We were anxious to enhance the level of the environmental agenda by 
reforming the old “protection” concept. We came up with an economic indicator through 
the CRGE. That is why we named the environment sector plan as Carbon Neutral Climate 
Resilient Economy (CNCR-E)”. This was the designation proposed prior to the CRGE. The 
CNCR-E was meant to show the deliberate intention of the shift in approach that avoided 
the previous dichotomy between the environment and the economy. The deliberateness is 
clear in the new linkage created between the two as qualified by an environment indicator 
(i.e. carbon neutrality) and an economic indicator (i.e., climate resilience). The respondent 
indicated that there is no “and” between the two. According to him, the “and” indicates 
separation between the two concepts - environment and development. The word “and” 
symbolizes an inherent difference, which we were trying to move away from. “Both the 
carbon neutrality and the climate resilience parameters indicated the type of economy we 
intend to build that factors in environmental resources as the basis for development. The 
term “economy” was included within a climate strategy because we too understood that the 
worst cause of environmental degradation is poverty. By so doing, we were able to shape 
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indicators in economic terms.” The whole process symbolizes an exercise of agency by a 
government division (environmental protection) towards what has hitherto been a 
competitor (economic development). A national economic planning process was used to re-
shape environmental goals. On the flip side, economic growth was used as the yardstick to 
track progress in environmental achievements as both assumed common indicators through 
the currency of carbon emission.  
This policy level revision of the environment portfolio characterized by the “green economy” 
narrative and the “transformation agenda” was later reinforced by structures meant to 
facilitate the top-down approach of policymaking.  
Structures  
Policy autonomy and change 
There were both vertical and horizontal organizational arrangements that induced, 
facilitated and strengthened the “green economy” narrative. Usually national policies are 
formulated under the exclusive “functional autonomy” of the agency with the specific 
mandate, and in most instances, the process is opaque to outsiders (McCool 1995:291). 
However, the CRGE formulation took a rather different route – at least at the time of its 
initiation. Being an environmental issue climate change is likely to be debated under the 
domain of the Environmental Protection Authority – which is the national institution with 
the core environmental competence. Of course the EPA has competitors with claims of 
mandates over the climate issue. Up until the Copenhagen Summit, mandates over climate 
matters were divided between two institutions. The focal point for the UNFCCC was the then 
National Meteorological Services Agency (NMSA). This is the entity that represented the 
country in international negotiations. It also implemented certain national actions such as 
the publication of the Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC in 2001 and 
coordinated the National Adaptation Programme of Action in 2007. On the other hand, EPA 
was the focal point for the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. Thus the mandate of representing 
the country at negotiations under the Kyoto Protocol (including the annual CDM-DNA 
Forums) as well as coordinating projects under the Clean Development Mechanism of the 
Kyoto Protocol belonged to the EPA. Immediately after the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 
2009, the mandate of following up all climate matters was transferred from the then NMSA 
to the EPA. It thus seemed clear that any initiation of a mitigation or adaptation strategy 
rested within the mandates of the EPA.  
By taking Sabatier and Weible’s analogy, an environment subsystem could best be thought 
of as “[environment] policy monopoly” (2014: 63). The authors further clarify this point by 
stating that a subsystem is a “definable institutional structure for policy making in an issue 
area.” Within the Ethiopian context, the environment policy monopoly is assigned (by law) 
to a distinct assembly of governmental and non-governmental actors. According to the 
Ethiopian Environmental Organs Establishment Proclamation No. 295/ 2002, the 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) together with the Environmental Council are 
responsible to initiate, review and adopt environmental policies. While the EPA is one of the 
executive branches of the government directly answerable to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
the Environmental Council is a larger assembly of actors. The EPA has, among other things, a 
mandate to initiate and draft policies and submit them for approval to this larger grouping 
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(FDRE 2002).  The Environmental Council is chaired by the Prime Minister (or a designate) 
but has representation from selected other Ministries; a representative from each of the 11 
national regional states3 as well as civil society organizations; the Chamber of commerce; 
and Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Union. In the past, this Council has been deliberating 
on a number of environmental issues and adopting a series of policies, strategies, laws, 
directives and standards aimed at achieving certain environmental and human health 
objectives. So the EPA-Environmental Council interrelation can be assumed as the core 
environmental policy-making arena with a distinct policy monopoly (Sabatier and Weible 
2014). As Weible, citing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), argue these national actors 
operate within the bounds of “territorial and substantive scopes” (Weible 2007: 98). The 
EPA-Council interrelation is substantively bound on environmental issues and territorially 
confined to federal limits. In this bounded space, the EPA is the sole initiator of policies as it 
has the task to ensure environmental objectives enshrined under the constitution of the 
country as well as the principles laid down under the 1997 environmental policy (FDRE 
1997). It gathers data (see Figure 1) from international assessments such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)4 regarding climate; undertake its own 
researches or even solicit information from the wider public to identify problems that 
require urgent policy action.  
Figure 1 below depicts the environmental policy subsystem in Ethiopia. Indeed, this has 
remained the sole mode of environmental policy making in Ethiopia – with the EPA defining 
an environmental problem and submitting proposals for wider debate at the Environmental 
Council. The adoption of the comprehensive environment policy of 1997 – which treated 
climate change as one of the ten sectoral problems – has followed the same modality with 
the EPA taking the lead.  
                                                          
 
3 Ethiopia follows a federal form of governance with two levels of administration. The federal 
government sets the rules on certain federal matters (such as setting minimum environmental 
standards) while exclusive local matters as well as residual power devolve to the 11 regional states. 
See Articles 52 and 53 of Proclamation No 1/ 1994, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia. Available online at http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/ethiopian-constitution-1994_en.pdf 
(FDRE 1994). 
4 The IPCC is a body with in the United Nations comprising climate scientists and tasked with 
aggregating climate related data for influencing policy making globally or by governments. More 
information on the IPCC from http://ipcc.ch/.  
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Figure 1. Environmental Subsystem in Ethiopia 
 
In fact some authors note that since the beginning of the 1990s, climate change policy 
making has passed through an incremental process largely remaining the least governmental 
priority, although with quite a few programs initiated to address it (Held et al. 2013). This 
demonstrates the stability of the subsystem and the incremental nature of environmental 
(climate) policy making in Ethiopia.  As Baumgartner et al. (2006) observe, environmental 
policy-making in Ethiopia remained completely under the radar of the policy subsystem 
without any significant political attention. It would have been unsurprising to expect the 
same in 2010 with the EPA probably redefining the climate change issue or submitting a 
proposal to the Environment Council.  However, as Sabatier and Weible well noted, “issues 
can not forever be considered within the confines of a policy subsystem; occasionally macro-
political forces intervene” (2014: 63). Exactly the same thing seems to have happened at 
later years as the CRGE was initiated. The EDRI (and not the EPA) triggered this process in 
2010.  It recruited an international consulting firm - McKinsey and Co - for facilitating the 
work. A researcher at EDRI explains how the process went:  
“Initially, we developed a concept note with McKinsey. Eventually, government technical 
people participated…through committees. The concept of green economy was quite new at 
that moment and we needed the technical support of McKinsey.” 
 
Of course, the “functional autonomy” precept of the mandated organization (McCool 1995) 
was bypassed by an organization with a core mandate of economic research and whose 
head is the Chief Economist. And this decided the venue for discussions on environmental 
matters as it changes from the more representative Environment Council to a streamlined, 
top-down organizational structure that was predominantly comprised of government actors. 
Some respondents were very much aware of these changes.  A former coordinator of the 
REDD/ Forests STC recalls “originally, EDRI led the CRGE process but later on handed it to the 
EPA…”  
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Whatever the rationale for these changes in approach, it resulted in measurement indicators 
that eventually got incorporated in the evolving climate policy. This confirms to the 
observation in the previous sections on why economic indicators were chosen to track 
progress towards environmental goals. This state of affairs was reinforced through 
subsequent organizational re-arrangements and the development of new working 
modalities that cascaded tasks in a top-down fashion – all the way from the Prime Minister’s 
Office to sector experts. The following section discusses this vertical alignment of 
organizations and the procedures in place that guided work in a rather short period of time. 
  
Organizational alignments and procedures 
The CRGE process was led by an inter-ministerial committee (IMC) comprising of six state 
Ministers, and chaired by the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister. This coordination 
committee meets every two months to hear updates from technical committees (TCs) and 
Sub-technical committees (STCs) under it, track sources of challenges and give directions for 
future actions. Beneath this platform is the Technical Committee comprised of assigned 
Directors from the six CRGE Ministries. The TC convenes every month and oversees the 
routine task of the STCs – a group of experts drawn from each of the technical ministries. 
The group is a dedicated pool of experts drawn from the respective CRGE Ministries and the 
agencies under each of the Ministries. They are assigned and mandated to finalize the 
national climate strategy. Thus, for instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and selected 
agricultural and forest research centers belonged to the Agriculture STC. According to the 
mandates conferred to it, the agriculture STC collects data relating to crop production, soil 
carbon, forest management as well as livestock emissions that will go into setting the 
baseline and projecting emission scenarios.  
The bulk of the CRGE work entailed massive search for sector-based data that could be used 
in setting the baseline (the base year being 2010) from which all projections and reduction 
ambitions were later calculated. This form of data suitable for baseline setting is hard to find 
in Ethiopia as documentation and its use is yet a poorly understood concept. The experts 
with in the STCs were expected to deliver this task with the utmost efficiency and discipline. 
Time series data collection within a fixed timeline while maintaining quality was indeed a 
gruesome task that requires dedication. A mix of carrots and sticks were used to ensure 
compliance of purpose and work schedule. An expert that involved in coordinating the STCs 
explains the motivation for the STCs.  
“The Technical committee evaluates the performance of each STC every time it convenes. 
Most of the motivation however came from personal interest to know about this new and 
promising knowledge area [green economy].” 
 
STC members were promised monetary reward at the completion of the mission. One STC 
member compares the monetary benefit with the size of responsibility that befell on his 
team “we [STCs] were given money at the end …but it came too late and was considerably 
smaller than what we anticipated and the level of work we did.” Apart from this reward, 
STCs were guided by disciplinary measures. A member of an STCs has this observation on the 
strictness of the modality of work: “We were given the traffic light system for data gathering 
where we would be signaled red, yellow and green depending on our level of compliance, 
mainly related to meeting deadlines.” Non-performance is reported to the respective sector 
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Ministers through the TC. Such work ethic was important to generate data in a timely 
manner as well as dig-in deeper to unravel the required time series data despite poor 
documentation prevalent across sectors. 
This top-down organizational alignment was efficient in bringing results in quite a short 
period of time. Within less than a year of the CRGE’s inception, major sectors were 
mobilized, workmanships assigned, rules of engagement designed and implemented , data 
generated, scenarios projected, abatement levers listed, shortlisting criteria adopted and 
measures selected – all these added up to formulate the Green Economy section of the 
national climate strategy.  
The organizational design that helped achieve this enjoyed high level political oversight. This 
alignment made it easy to ensure the flow of authority and guidance to those doing 
groundwork at the base. However, such organizational alignment does not seem to allow for 
the transmission of expert knowledge to a policy product. In fact, the level of influence that 
scientific expertise had on the final product was limited to a large measure. There are two 
explanations for this. First, the system operated in a closed loop where only government 
officers were involved. Second, even the government sectors involved (such as STC 
members) were confined to the task of collecting data within the scope of their respective 
sectors rather than data analysis. An international consulting firm (McKinsey & Co.) did most 
of the facilitative and analytical work. Outputs from this activity chain (data aggregation by 
STCs and analysis by McKinsey) was then scrutinized by the Technical Committee chaired by 
the Deputy Director General of the EPA, and later by the Inter-Ministerial Committee chaired 
by the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister. A former coordinator of the technical 
committee points out how workmanship was managed: “…STCs gather the data and we 
discuss it internally with McKinsey.” The STC’s role was thus not anything more than data 
collection within their sectors. An STC member has this flashback memory: “we fetched and 
aggregated data that we never thought existed … we never used such data to perform our 
routine work.” While STCs were the sources of raw data that enabled the formulation of the 
green economy plan, the creation of a path for the flow of information from experts to the 
Ministerial committee accompanied by the highest observance of discipline enabled data 
collection and analysis in a rather very short period of time. The CRGE formation process 
begun at the end of 2010 and culminated shortly before the end of 2011 for an international 
launch of the national Green Economy Plan at the Durban Climate Summit. The “green 
economy” narrative that originated at the highest political level was reinforced by a vertical 
structure undergird by a procedure and a work ethic commanding strict observance of 
deadlines and quality of work. There was no space for outsider views as this structure 
operated in a closed loop entertaining perspectives only from government agencies and 
experts.  
Alternative voices  
As most rightly noted civil society engagement is the weaker link of the CRGE strategy (Jones 
and Carabine 2013). This is despite the fact that most of the community level work 
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particularly on climate adaptation is carried out by NGOs5. A respondent that has once been 
an advisor to a prominent CRGE donor – the DFID – stated that there is a wealth of 
knowledge among civil society members that engage in grassroots climate actions - than any 
of the government branches actually carrying out work at the community level. But the 
system did not allow for this type of NGO-based knowledge to inform policy processes. This 
echoes a deliberate politico-legal posture consistently assumed by the government for the 
past several years. Restraints on civic action in general relates to one of the strongest 
features of the developmental state ideology pursued by the Ethiopian government where in 
the government bears a prime role of driving economic development. Senior level politicians 
and those in EPRDF party leadership often claim that it is the government’s task to provide 
the political space within which others could play. The late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, 
was a staunch supporter of the idea that civil society activism, free press and strong 
parliament “… distracts the agendas of the developmental state” (Tadesse undated: 5). The 
lack of engagement by civil society at least at the policy formulation level is an offshoot of 
this political climate that disenfranchised civil society activism in Ethiopia. The space got 
even narrower for civil society engagement because of a law introduced in 2009 in Ethiopia 
at around the time of CRGE initiation. 
This law - Proclamation No 621/ 2009 - provides the space within which civil society activism 
could take place and was consistently noted for its restraining effect on charity organizations 
that implement rights-based activism (Dupuy et al. 2015). According to the Proclamation the 
formation of three types of CSOs is allowed, namely Ethiopian charities, Ethiopian resident 
charities, and foreign charities. The restrictive nature of the law is clear on two related fronts 
– scope of engagement and modality of financial access and utilization. On the former issue, 
the law allows CSOs registered as Ethiopian locals only to engage in advocacy of civil rights 
and the promotion of governance. All other formations are not allowed to perform activities 
in the realm of rights-based activism in general. However, local charities that are allowed to 
engage in such activities, can only access their main income from local sources (in the 
proportion of 90% to 10% that can respectively be accessed from local and foreign sources). 
On the reverse, the other formations - Ethiopian registered or foreign charities – can source 
their substantial revenues from foreign sources. However, they are not allowed to engage in 
rights related activities. For instance, climate change advocacy or advocating the rights of 
vulnerable groups and those marginalized sections of the society etc. is a realm specifically 
assigned for local NGOs. Hence, it is only local NGOs – whose main source of funding 
remains local – that can engage in these sorts of activities. Since the adoption of the law in 
2009, the role of environmental activism in general and the involvement of civil society in 
climate change activities have considerably declined. Article 44 of the FDRE constitution on 
the right to a clean and healthy environment is included under the “democratic rights” 
section, which when invoked and acted upon by non-local CSO formations seem to tamper 
with the 10% – 90 % rule and raise a legality question. Linking climate advocacy to the rights 
of citizens may thus provoke this specific problem.  
 
                                                          
 
5 Among many circles in Ethiopia, the term “civil society” is interchangeably used to mean any 
grouping outside government and often registered according to the national Charity Laws. 
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Despite this constraining feature on rights’ advocacy, the CSO law has provided some room 
for CSO action on environmental management (land reclamation, watershed management, 
water conservation, afforestation etc.). It allows for securing 90% of funding from outside 
sources when it comes to activities related to the direct management of natural resources 
and environmental protection. Thus civil society organizations are allowed to engage in 
grassroots activities that are “non-rights” actions, but are prohibited from engagement on 
strategic or policy matters that may closely be associated with rights’ advocacy.  
The overall CSO space has created unease to its members that wish to involve at a strategic 
policy making level. Coordinator of one of the largest civil society consortia on climate 
change - the Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate Change - expressed the paucity of 
civic engagement in the CRGE process. “We attend workshops only when we were invited, 
and …as such this has not been to listen to our concerns.” Whenever invitations were 
extended for civil society participation it was not for consultation. The coordinator of the 
climate NGO consortium adds, “...when we were invited at such events, for instance, during 
the informal donors forum periodically organized by DFID, it was more like a status update 
for the civil society.” The stand that NGOs may not involve in policy making seems to have 
gained acceptance by the NGO constituency themselves. An NGO member working on 
climate change observes “there is no limitation on us to work with grassroots communities 
… but policy making was never in our reach. … if they want inputs they would ask for it.” She 
gave one example of an NGO involvement when the EPACC was drafted. The NGO she 
worked for was invited to facilitate community engagement in order to prioritize adaptation 
requirements and response measures to one of the regional states.  
In general, civil society presence at the government policy sessions was only by invitation. 
Even then, it was a one-way communication where civil society members had to listen or 
give data inputs only when requested. Limitation on civic engagement was not only the 
result of the limiting law. This was backed by the all too confining CRGE organizational 
alignment (i.e. Sub-technical Committee, Technical Committee and the Inter-Ministerial 
Committee) that has excluded expertise from a non-governmental sector.  
International Political factors: mitigation over adaptation?  
Respondents that were closely involved in the CRGE process underscore the significant role 
the international dynamics and negotiations had in shaping up the national process. A 
coordinator of the REDD/ Forests STC states:  
“The international drive played a lot in ensuring a timely completion of the CRGE. Ethiopia 
suddenly became a focus…donors want to pilot the country in most of the projects designed 
to support developing countries on climate actions.” 
Authors note that Ethiopia had been tactical in making the case for mitigation before the 
international community not to mention the coincidence with the timing of key milestones 
(for instance Jones and Carabine 2013). The selection of the late Prime Minister to represent 
Africa at least for three consecutive terms and his leadership of the high-level Advisory 
Group on Climate Finance in 2010 helped to put Ethiopia in the global spotlight and spurred 
high-level support for its mitigation ambition. In addition, unveiling the strategy in Durban 
was all the more a calculated move. As Jones and Carabine note, Durban was a perfect 
venue “… where the governing instruments of the Green Climate Fund were high on the 
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agenda” (2013:14). Indeed the high level event called upon by the Ethiopian government in 
the margins of the CoP garnered the interests of governments as well as bilateral and 
multilateral donors. The Prime Minister of Norway promised monetary injection to the tune 
of 60 million USD per annum to realize some of the initiatives unveiled in the Green 
Economy plan while others stressed their support without express financial commitments. In 
the context of Ethiopia’s performance at Durban in 2011, it gives the impression that the 
entire CRGE process was well-planned from the outset. It demanded a process ownership 
that operated in a closed-loop that allowed for entertainment of minimal alternative views 
but compels an urgency and accountability for inactions.  
The exposure to global realities, emerging circumstances and global negotiation dynamics 
was not confined to high-level politicians alone. This has effect over the top-down chain of 
information flow necessary for the realization of the CRGE initiative in a rather short period 
of time. The annual conferences of parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the various 
other inter-sessional meetings (those happening between each conference of the parties) 
contributed to shaping up national understandings of how the climate problem is framed 
and the various response measures. Usually, the Secretariat of the UNFCCC covers the 
presence of two delegates from developing countries at the annual conferences of the 
parties. Other donors support delegates of their sector preference to a section or the full 
stretch of the meetings. For instance, the World Food Program commissioned the 
attendance of delegates from the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture for most of the yearly 
climate conferences between the launch of the CRGE in Durban (2011) and the Paris Climate 
Summit in 2015. The DFID country program on climate change had a component to extend 
such forms of support to national governments too. DFID covered the full cost of 
participation of Ethiopian climate negotiators through a tailored programme named 
“Negotiations Support Project” covering years 2011 to 2016. Under the coordinating role of 
the MEFCC, the project sponsored a delegate from each CRGE sector as well as members of 
the Ethiopian parliament. Outside the auspices of the UNFCCC there are other discussion 
venues such as the Climate Vulnerable Forum, Cartagena Dialogue, Petersburg Dialogue 
Forum etc., which has respective funding channels to ensure participation of Ethiopian 
experts. At various levels, national experts gained access to such global forums and this has 
value in exposing them to emerging trends. Though difficult to establish cause and effect 
relationship, it may be taken that such exposures helped to frame national understandings 
and perception on the climate issue as a social problem and the allocation of responsibility 
for its response. As stated earlier, such experience at all levels may have made it easier for 
narratives that shaped the response to the problem across national governance levels.  
The Ethiopian mitigation plan (i.e. the Green Economy section of the CRGE) preceded any 
comprehensive national plan on adaptation. Respondents have diverse explanations as to 
why a mitigation route was pursued as a priority while there was compelling evidence on 
Ethiopia’s sensitivity to climate risks justifying for an urgent adaptation strategy. There was 
sufficient documentary evidence for this too (for instance NMSA 2001; Deressa et al. 2008; 
World Bank 2010; Bryan et al. 2011). Some respondents that were involved in coordinating 
the CRGE process saw that amplifying the mitigation ambition had relative benefits owing to 
global circumstances. An advisor to the Ministry of Industry underlines that such a pursuit 
will enable the country to own the “cleanest grid” in Africa. In line with this argument, 
renewable power generation has formed one of the four pillars of the CRGE - the three 
others being reducing emissions from agriculture; enhancing the sink function of forests and 
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the utilization of advanced technologies across sectors. Some respondents allege that the 
time factor was important too. The former director of EPA explains, “the country was at 
cross roads where it needed to decide between an economy driven by fossil fuel or a new 
stream of renewable energy mix comprising wind, solar and hydropower.” Recounting 
statements from the then prime minister, he further explains, “the country had to sustain 
the double-digit economic growth it was achieving while redirecting the path of growth. … 
we chose to avoid lock-ins in fossil-fuel based technologies that the rest of the world 
followed since industrial revolution … but are yet in a difficult situation to reverse…” Indeed, 
it was a tenable decision to embrace newer forms of technologies. Most of the developed 
world was already “locked-in” old technologies that lingered since industrial revolution. 
Whereas for Ethiopia, it was just picking up on economic development when the CRGE 
timing coincided with the need to decide on the choice of technologies. The CRGE thus 
seemed to open a window that compelled policymakers to decide on future directions for 
most of the decisive sectors (such as agriculture, transport, industry. etc.). 
Another respondent working with in the CRGE Facility – the funding vehicle of the CRGE – 
expressed the same logic in terms of resource efficiency. He stated that Ethiopia is endowed 
with vast wind, solar and geothermal energy resources that it can legitimately exploit. 
Similar to “the cleanest grid” narrative, the respondent claims an opportunity to become “… 
a regional hegemon” of novel forms of electric power with base load in renewable 
resources. This could be used to generate foreign currency through “clean power exported 
to the neighboring countries” the respondent explains. This seems a sound rationale given 
the fact that almost all Ethiopia’s neighbors are dependent on fossil fuel as a source of 
energy. Using this same logic, the late Prime Minister repeatedly asserted that Ethiopia 
would lose little to nothing if green growth is embraced as a development trajectory. In a 
similar tone, an expert at the Ministry of Transport mentioned the potential to tap into the 
global carbon finance pool if such a path is to be pursued. “Nobody finances adaptation 
actions, at least, in the foreseeable future” he remarked, all the more, underlining why 
mitigation should be a strategic priority.  
It may be argued that Ethiopia has had an adaptation plan before the mitigation strategy. An 
expert at the CRGE Facility invokes the 2007 National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA) as the earliest of these. However, despite its name, the NAPA has often been 
criticized for the lack of a long-term vision on adaptation. It simply followed a project-based 
approach and hence could not be considered as a long-term policy objective. Besides, the 
NAPA was a response of the international community towards addressing immediate climate 
related hazards in LDCs. Nonetheless, a more programmatic adaptation plan was 
subsequently introduced in 2010, initiated by the EPA. This one entitled the Ethiopian 
Programme of Adaptation on Climate Change (EPACC) is a national attempt to aggregate 
possible adaptation actions across sectors but without ambitions or assessment parameters 
for measuring vulnerabilities across a spectrum of scenarios. In describing the form of the 
adaptation programme under the EPACC framework, a respondent involved in both the 
CRGE and EPACC processes highlighted that “mitigation is adaptation.”  Qualifying this 
statement, a former employee of EPA indicated the thinking behind this as: 
As we develop the EPACC, we avoided the use of the word “adaptation” and reframed it in 
economic terms. As such adaptation is about expenditures required to enhance resilience 
…and thus the EPACC is a question of understanding the cost of reducing vulnerability. 
Mitigation and adaptation are the same. … climate interventions [including adaptation 
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measures] at the same time mitigate the emission of gasses while reducing the cost of 
vulnerability. 
These lines of arguments pervading policy maker discourses placed adaptation in the midst 
of the green economy. Some of these stories are suggestive of the tendencies to reframe 
both mitigation and adaptation goals in economic metrics to prepare the country for any 
upcoming funding or investment channels. The EPACC had another iteration in 2016, where 
it was re-touched without substantive changes to its content and got renamed the National 
Adaptation Plans (NAPs). “NAPs” is the designation given to national plans on adaptation as 
per expectations of the Cancun Agreement in 2010. Developing countries were required to 
develop adaptation plans to be able to access finance designated for climate resilient actions 
from an internationally dedicated fund. Though Ethiopia is not alone in re-branding existing 
plans and renaming it to fit pre-designed expectations (foreign assistance tailored to specific 
plans, for example), a respondent who is also member to the national negotiation team 
claims, “…NAPs is essentially the EPACC. It is the same in both style and content”. In a NAPs 
workshop hosted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change in May 2016, 
an employee of the MEFCC stated the justification for re-naming an existing adaptation 
document was to “access finance allotted by the UNFCCC for NAPs preparation.” A larger 
package that outlines potential climate adaptation actions across sectors is being designed 
across sectors through the Climate Resilience section of the CRGE. Overall the green 
economy narrative has an understanding of adaptation as embedded, an understanding 
which gained acceptance from most organizations and policy makers.  
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9. Discussion and conclusions
In the not too distant past, industrialized countries that took measures to unilaterally adopt 
national emission targets were praised for their bold steps or for being pace setters relative 
to the more common diplomacy that chose to wait-and-see rather than take actions (Binder 
and Tews 2004). Given their historical responsibility and the legal obligation imposed on 
them to curb emissions, such steps may not sound astounding. On the other hand, setting as 
ambitious a national goal as carbon neutrality while there is no legal obligation under 
multilateral agreements and while being a Least Developed Country may sound unduly 
ambitious and disproportionately aggressive. Such is what Ethiopia did in 2010-2011 when 
the zero-net emissions trajectory was unveiled. The green economy narrative helped to 
frame the problem, the specific measures ought to be taken and the time frame for action.  
This narrative helped to decide whose interests were to be taken seriously and whose to be 
ignored. The “green economy” storyline that emerged and used repetitively during the CRGE 
formulation was strong from two perspectives. First, it came from the highest political 
authority in the country – the Prime Minister. Secondly, it locked the solution for the climate 
problem in one development pattern, arguably, leaving no room for alternatives. It was 
affirmed that mitigation is an option that could effortlessly be embraced and for which 
finance could be attained rather easily. Mitigation thus came much more forcefully as a 
solution towards tackling the climate problem. The notion of “green economy” appeared in 
government documents and was often highlighted in official government remarks. It was 
utilized to describe current development challenges and amplify opportunities that in turn 
helped to routinize climate change actions across government sectors. Such narrations were 
employed, not only to describe the stakes attached to the pursuit of such line of 
development but more so to reveal the costs attached for failing to do so.  
Narratives often gain expression and force when backed by structures. By structures, it is 
meant here organizations: the collective actors in the field of environment in Ethiopia; and 
institutions: the rules, norms, and procedures that provide the framework for CRGE 
initiation and implementation. Though opaque to the outside world, the CRGE development 
process enjoyed some form of organizational structure and institutional arrangements that 
provided the ground for shaping up its final form. The entire process followed a top-down 
approach in the exclusivity of government officials aided by certain technical experts on a 
need basis. Alternative voices were not prominent, as the closed loop system could not 
allow civilian voices that often had perspectives for goal setting and approaches of goal 
achievement. The space was narrow for active involvement of civil society especially at a 
strategic policy making level. A Charities law that was adopted in 2009 reinforced this 
standpoint. The green economy notion enabled the re-instatement of environmental 
concerns in development paradigms. The EPA and its leadership used the opportunity to 
exercise agency that enabled to redefine the concept and perception of environmental 
protection.  
The Ethiopian climate policymaking did also reflect international political dynamics shaping 
up with in bilateral or multilateral diplomatic spaces. Cross-national learning on climate 
change policies occurs through mechanisms of global governance that include 
harmonization, imposition or diffusion (Helge 2004). Researches underscore the role of 
diffusion of international norms and practices into domestic policies especially as countries 
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gain motivation to advance specific economic interests. The timing of the CRGE launch was 
briefly preceded by major global and national circumstances that have implications on 
Ethiopia’s climate policy direction. Climate change was presented as an eminent and serious 
threat globally requiring local efforts across the globe, including by developing countries that 
allegedly had no historical responsibilities. It was also portrayed as something that brought 
forth significant opportunities for national governments in terms of the potential for access 
into novel technologies, access to climate finance and deployment of emerging renewable 
energy solutions. This resonates with the results attained in subsequent years that included 
the launch of the light rail system in Addis Ababa completed in 2015 (the first tramway 
system in sub-Saharan Africa), the Great Renaissance Dam under construction that is set to 
generate around 6000 megawatts of hydroelectric power, and the renewable energy based 
Ethiopia-Djibouti inter-country electric railway line launched in October 2016. Most of the 
finances for these projects came from soft loans and foreign funding. The urge to embrace 
these new technologies and tap into global climate finance shaped national perceptions on 
response mechanisms – making mitigation a prior concern over adaptation. The “green 
economy” storyline was very instrumental in this regard and heavily used as a justification.  
Policymaking does not happen in a vacuum. Neither is it linear in the sense of tackling social 
problems with groups mandated to resolve them. It is essentially relational. Multiple 
interests mingle in domestic political spaces but also with linkages with supranational 
players. Narratives created along the way can lock solutions and determine the approach to 
be pursued. These in turn gain reinforcement from structures and designed procedures that 
influence who has access to the agenda and who does not. Human agency has a central role 
in this complex process where various actors use opportunities to use information to fit their 
personal or organizational interests. 
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11. Appendix: Interview checklist
1. General
 Describe the national climate policy process (you may begin from the CRGE formulation
stage or before)?
 What was your role in policy formulation and/or policy implementation?
 How climate change perceived? An opportunity/ a challenge? What kinds of policy
responses were deemed appropriate then?
 What narratives beyond climate change affect how climate change is integrated into policy
spheres?
 What kinds of adaptation options—incremental or more fundamentally transformative—
were considered?
 How were policy dialogues carried out? Were you involved?
2. Structures and procedures
 What organizations were involved and how influential were they in the CRGE process?
 What are their mandates?
 What are their interests?
 What are the sources of their power and legitimacy?
 What are their capacities/ constraints in relation to shaping and implementing policy?
3. Institutions
 What were the relevant institutions that helped the CRGE formulation process:
 For policy formulation (ex: IMC, STC, Livestock Task Force)?
 Shaping how people respond to the policy environment?
 Were there institutionalized procedures for guiding activities during the policy formulation
process?
4. Role of structures and procedures in the policy environment
 Which formal and/ or informal interaction processes were at play?
 Is there a mechanism to allow information from the grassroots feeds back into the CRGE or
policy processes?
 How does structures and procedures allow CRGE get implemented?
 How do local actors respond to or take advantage of policies?
5. Interests and Practices
 What are the real material interests of the different actors within the CRGE policy
environment?
 How do people draw upon, interpret, circumvent, or resist institutional frameworks in order
to pursue specific objectives that shape the CRGE policy environment?
 How do people draw upon prevailing discourse or develop counter-narratives in order to
pursue specific objectives that shape the CRGE policy environment?
 In what ways do people exert agency in the CRGE policymaking processes?
6. Role of Practices in the policy environment
 How do interests and practices shape policymaking processes? How and through which
pathways do actors access scientific information?
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The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) works to improve food security and 
reduce poverty in developing countries through research for better and more sustainable use 
of livestock. ILRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium, a global research partnership of 15 
centres working with many partners for a food-secure future. ILRI has two main campuses in 
East Africa and other hubs in East, West and Southern Africa and South, Southeast and East 
Asia. ilri.org 
 
 
CGIAR is a global agricultural research partnership for a food-secure future. Its science is 
carried out by 15 research centres that are members of the CGIAR Consortium in 
collaboration with hundreds of partner organizations. cgiar.org 
 
